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This study provides an overview of inequality trends in Indonesia for the period 
from 1984 to 2002. Different from previous studies on inequality in Indonesia, we 
use data on  household consumption  expenditure  that  takes into  account  price 
differentials  across  regions.  We  found  that,  although  all  measures  indicate  a 
decrease in inequality during the economic crisis, it actually increased for those 
below the poverty line. We also found that because inequality during the peak of 
the crisis in 1999 was at its lowest level in 15 years, the poverty rate decreased 
very rapidly during the recovery between 1999 and 2002. 
JEL Classification:  D63, I32, O15
Keywords:  Inequality, poverty, economic growth, Indonesia
# Corresponding author: Daniel Suryadarma, SMERU Research Institute, Jl. Tulung Agung No. 46, 
Jakarta 10310, Indonesia, email: dsuryadarma@smeru.or.id, phone: 62-21-31936336, fax: 62-21-
31930850.
* We  would  like  to  thank  seminar  participants  at  the  National  Development  Planning  Agency 
(Bappenas) and at the University of Indonesia Economics Seminar for comments and suggestions. 
We are also grateful to Daniel Perwira and Wenefrida Widyanti for research assistance. 
I. INTRODUCTION
While many people and governments, especially in developing countries, 
put enormous faith in economic growth as the most essential indicator of progress 
in the well being of their populace, more critical minds would undoubtedly think 
that there is more to human well being than just economic growth. In the past few 
years,  development  economists  have  talked  in  more  urgent  terms  about  the 
importance of the quality of growth in addition to mere economic growth rates. This 
can be seen from the increased number of studies that measure the contribution of 
economic  growth  to  widely-used  factors  that  measure  quality  of  life  such  as 
democracy, job opportunity, health, poverty reduction and income distribution (for 
example Barro, 2002; Hines Jr. et al., 2001; see section III for more).
The new emphasis that economists put on the quality of growth means 
that there are more important things than just the basic numbers. These include 
who  benefits  from  growth;  what  kind  of  environmental  damage  accompanies 
growth and whether the costs associated with the damage are included in the 
analysis of growth; whether growth is equally distributed among all income groups; 
whether growth only benefits the rich while leaving the poor out; whether growth 
helps the poor escape poverty; whether growth only benefits certain sectors of the 
economy  or  reaches  all  sectors;  whether  children  and  women  also  enjoy  the 
benefits  from growth  and  whether  growth  plays  a  positive  or  negative  role  in 
achieving income, and eventually welfare, equality among people of a country.
From all  the  different  questions  that  one  asks  in  order  to  assess  the 
quality of growth, in this study we focus on the question of inequality. Before the 
onset of the economic crisis in mid 1997, there is no doubt that Indonesia had an 
extended  period  of  high  economic  growth.  There  is  still  controversy  however, 
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about  whether  the  benefits  of  this  period  of  high  growth  have  been  equally 
distributed among the whole population or largely accrued only to the politically 
and  economically  well-connected  minority.  While  popular  perceptions  strongly 
support the latter (Utomo, 2004), the relatively abundant studies on inequality in 
Indonesia  in  general  have  failed  to  find  quantitative  evidence  to  support  this 
popular belief and have found, in fact, that Indonesia’s income inequality has been 
relatively low and stable. During the 1990s, Indonesia’s Gini coefficient – a widely 
used  measure  of  inequality  –  was  lower  than  neighbouring  countries  such  as 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, and even lower than the average Gini 
coefficient of high income countries (Sudjana & Mishra, 2004).
In this study, we reassess the calculation of inequality measures by taking 
into account price disparities across regions in Indonesia. There is evidence of a 
significant price differential across regions in Indonesia, making the real value of 
the  rupiah highly variable between regions. Although this differential  should be 
considered in any study of inequality (Arndt & Sundrum, 1975; Asra, 1999), almost 
all previous inequality studies in Indonesia have ignored this aspect of Indonesian 
household expenditure data. By deflating the nominal expenditure with a regional 
price index, we ensure that every rupiah in our household expenditure data carries 
equal purchasing power across regions. For simplicity, we refer to the deflated 
expenditure as the real expenditure.
Since there is no published data available in Indonesia on regional price 
differentials, we use regional poverty lines that were calculated in Pradhan et al. 
(2001) as the regional price index. These regional poverty lines are based on a 
single  national  basket  of  goods  multiplied  by  regional  price  levels,  so  that 
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differences in the poverty lines across regions simply reflect the differences in the 
price levels across regions.
This study consists of two main parts. In the first part we reassess the 
evolution  of  inequality  in  Indonesia during  the period between 1984 and 2002 
using  several  widely  used  inequality  measures  with  the  household  per  capita 
expenditure  data  taken  from  the  Consumption  Module  Susenas  (National 
Socioeconomic Survey). Since this period covers both the pre-crisis high growth 
period and the crisis low growth period, we are able to conjecture how inequality 
evolves with economic growth. Furthermore, in the second part of the study we 
examine whether a relationship exists between inequality and poverty in Indonesia 
during  the  same  period.  To  see  the  role  of  inequality  in  the  poverty-growth 
relationship,  we  utilize  a  model  to  estimate  the  “distribution-corrected”  growth 
elasticity of the poverty rate using provincial level data.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly reviews the 
Indonesian  economy during its  high  growth  period  from 1984 – 1996 and the 
aftershock of the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997. Section III discusses 
different inequality measurements and reviews the literature on inequality studies 
both generally and specifically in the Indonesian context. Section IV describes the 
data used in this study. Section V provides the analysis on inequality evolution. 
Section  VI  examines  the  role  of  inequality  in  poverty  reduction  in  Indonesia. 
Finally, Section VII provides the conclusions.
II. A QUICK OVERVIEW OF INDONESIA 1984-2002
Indonesia  experienced  an  extended  period  of  high  economic  growth 
between 1984 and 1996, before the Asian economic crisis brought this to an end 
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in  1997.  Table  1  shows  some  indicators  of  basic  economic  performance  of 
Indonesia between 1984 and 2002. For consistency with analysis in this paper, we 
only show the years where a Consumption Module Susenas was carried out.
Table 1
Indonesian Basic Economic Indicators
Annual Inflation Rate Average Poverty
Year Real GDP (yoy, %) Exchange Rate Rate (%)
Growth (%)  (Rp./US$)  
1984 7.0 3.63 1,070 56.68
1987 5.3 3.94 1,644 45.95
1990 7.5 3.91 1,843 32.68
1993 6.8 6.53 2,087 25.32
1996 7.3 8.71 2,342 17.44
1999 0.3 34.47 7,100 27.13
2002 4.1 10.03 9,269 12.22
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BPS data  
During the high growth period, the economy grew at an average rate of 
around 7% annually,  while inflation was relatively low between 1984 and 1990 
before climbing to 6.5% in 1993 and then 8.7% in 1996. The average exchange 
rate  difference  between  1984  and  1987  was  quite  significant  because  of 
devaluation  in  1986,  and  after  1987  up  to  1996  the  exchange  rate  was 
continuously depreciated at relatively stable rates. Furthermore, the government 
was very successful in reducing poverty before the crisis, which is shown by the 
decrease in the poverty rate from 56.7% in 1984 to 17.4% in 1996, just before the 
onset of the crisis.
In  1997,  the  economic  crisis  hit  Indonesia.  Numerous  papers  have 
documented the crisis in Indonesia from different points of view (Kenward, 2002; 
Levinsohn et. al., 1999; Strauss et al., 2004; Suryahadi et al., 2003 to mention a 
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few). In short, the crisis caused Indonesia’s worst economic recession since the 
1960s. The rupiah began a free fall from 3,000 rupiah in August 1997 to around 
15,000 rupiah against the dollar in June 1998. From January 1998 to March 1999, 
nominal food prices increased threefold. In September 1998, the food CPI reached 
261 relative to around 100 in January 1997, while the CPIs for housing, clothing, 
and health reached 156, 225, and 204 respectively.
Although the crisis started as a crisis in the financial and banking sector, it 
quickly  spilled  over  to  the  real  sector.  Real  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP) 
contracted by almost 14% in 1998 and remained stagnant in 1999. The investment 
sector  was  heavily  affected  by  the  downturn  as  real  gross  domestic  fixed 
investment fell by 36% in 1998. Since nominal wages rose more slowly than food 
prices during this period, real income declined. The impact of the crisis on welfare 
is reflected by the increase in the poverty rate from around 15% in the second half 
of 1997 to 33% by the end of 1998. (Darja et al., 2004).
Economic performance in 1999 was still  affected by the crisis with real 
GDP only  growing at  0.3%,  a  year-on-year  inflation rate  of  34.4%,  very  weak 
rupiah compared  to  1996,  and  a  huge  spike  in  the  poverty  rate  that  even 
surpassed the 1993 poverty rate. Coupled with population growth, this meant that 
there was a large increase in absolute numbers of people below the poverty line. 
In 2002, 5 years after the crisis, the poverty rate had decreased to its lowest level 
since 1984 and stood at 12.22%,1 a record low in Indonesia, and inflation had 
decreased to 10.5%.
1 The poverty rate calculation in 2002 did not include Aceh, Maluku, and Papua. We have therefore 
estimated that if each of those three provinces had a poverty rate of 50%, the national poverty rate 
would be 14%. The exclusion of the three provinces does not therefore, affect our argument that 
the poverty rate had decreased by half between 1999 and 2002.
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III. INEQUALITY MEASUREMENTS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
a. Overview of different inequality measurements
There are several widely used indicators to measure inequality: Gini ratio, 
Generalized Entropy index,  and Atkinson’s  inequality  index.2 The Gini  ratio,  or 
sometimes referred to as Gini coefficient, is the measure of inequality that is most 
widely used. This measure is calculated based on the comparison between the 
cumulative  distribution  of  a  Lorenz  curve  with  the  cumulative  distribution  of  a 
uniform  distribution.  Figure  1  illustrates  the  calculation  of  Gini  ratio.  In  the 
horizontal  axis of  this figure, the population is ordered from the poorest to the 
richest, with the Lorenz curve showing the cumulative distribution of their income. 
Meanwhile, the line of equality is drawn based on the assumption that everybody 
in the population has the same income.
In this figure, Gini ratio is simply calculated as: 
BA
ARatioGini
+
= (1)
where A is the area between the line of equality and Lorenz curve, while B is the 
area below the Lorenz curve. If there is no inequality (i.e. perfect equality) then the 
Lorenz curve will be right on top of the line of equality, which means area A is 0, 
implying a Gini ratio = 0. On the other hand, if there is perfect inequality, that is 
there is only one person who owns everything, then area B is 0, implying a Gini 
ratio = 1. 
2 More  recently,  there  are  new  techniques  of  inequality  decomposition  proposed  by  several 
researchers. For example, Mussard et. al., 2003; de la Vega & Urrutia, 2003; Wan, 2002.
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Figure 1.  Lorenz Curve and the Calculation of Gini Ratio
The Generalized Entropy (GE) index is an inequality measure defined by 
the following formula:
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where  y is  income,  i indexes  the  population,  and  N is  the  total  number  of 
population. Meanwhile, the parameter α represents the weight given to levels of 
well-being at different parts of the distribution. The most commonly used values of 
α are 0 (sensitive to the lower end of the distribution), 1 (sensitive to the middle), 
and 2 (sensitive to the upper end). GE with α value of 0 is called Theil’s L while GE 
with α = 1 is called Theil’s T.  The value of  the GE index ranges from zero to 
infinity, with GE = 0 implying no inequality in the distribution.
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The last widely used inequality measurement is the Atkinson index. This 
index  is  a  measurement  of  inequality  that  explicitly  incorporates  normative 
judgments  about  social  welfare  (Atkinson,  1970).  The  general  formula  for  the 
Atkinson index is:
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where ε is the degree of inequality aversion or a society’s preference for equality. 
Higher values of ε indicate that a society is more averse to inequality. Hence, the 
calculation is more sensitive to changes in the lower end of the distribution. The 
Atkinson index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect inequality.
b. Literature review on inequality
Ever since Kuznets put forward his hypothesis of the inverted-U shaped 
relationship between income level and inequality (Kuznets, 1955), many studies 
have tried to relate inequality to income level, poverty and economic growth.3 On 
the relationship between inequality and growth, there is a basic agreement that the 
causality could go both ways. There are, however, two conflicting sides: those who 
claim that inequality has a positive impact on growth and those who believe and 
have proven that inequality may retard growth. Excellent reviews of the literature 
can be found in Aghion et al. (1999) and Barro (1999).
A study in the United States rejected the importance of  inequality  and 
claimed that it is poverty rather than inequality that should be tackled with vigour 
3 The validity of Kuznets’ inverted-U shaped curve can be proven in some studies but not in others. 
Although this is the case, Kuznets is still regarded as one of the pioneers of inequality studies. 
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(Feldstein, 1998). On the other hand, a cross-country study (Deininger & Squire, 
1998) found that there is a strong negative relationship between initial inequality in 
the asset distribution and long-term growth.4 This study also found that inequality 
reduces income growth for the poor but not the rich.
Barro (1999) classified the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth into four categories: credit market imperfections, political economy, social 
unrest, and savings rates. In a world where access to credit is limited, investment 
opportunities depend on one’s assets and income. This means poor people have 
no  access  to  investments  that  offer  high  rates  of  return.  Consequently,  a 
redistribution of assets from the rich to the poor will enable the poor to gain access 
to  these  investment  opportunities  and,  in  turn,  increase  the  rate  of  economic 
growth. Barro also claims that a greater degree of inequality would motivate more 
redistribution through political process and that this will create economic distortion. 
In turn, the distortion would reduce growth. This means lowering inequality would 
increase growth. Thirdly, inequality of wealth and income motivates the poor to 
turn to crime and violence and this is detrimental to economic growth. So from this 
perspective high inequality is bad for growth. In addition to providing an excellent 
compilation of other literatures, this paper also investigated the link using cross-
country data and concluded that inequality retards growth in poor countries but 
encourages growth in richer ones.
Aghion et al. (1999) stated that the effect of growth on inequality can be 
through acquisition of new technologies. In short, there are two channels through 
which technological advances can increase inequality: (1) between the group that 
acquires  the  new  technology  faster,  hence  consequently  can  demand  higher 
4 This  is  not  the only  paper that  found the negative  relationship  between initial  inequality  and 
growth. See Aghion et al. (1999) for a thorough overview.
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wages, and the group that acquires the technology slower; and (2) through intra-
group increases  in  inequality:  between workers  who are  highly  adaptable  and 
those who are not as adaptable, although they have the same education level to 
acquire  the  new technology.  The extent  to  which  the  growth  process  actually 
induces rising inequality however, depends on the institutional characteristics of 
each  country.  They  also  said  that  education  narrows  the  differential  between 
skilled and unskilled workers and therefore has the direct effect of reducing wage 
inequality.
The  level  of  inequality  raises  the  question  of  whether  redistribution  is 
necessary  or  not.  There  is  also  conflicting  evidence  regarding  the  effect  of 
redistribution  on  growth.  Easterly  &  Rebello  (1993)  found  that  redistribution  is 
harmful for growth, while two studies (Aghion et al., 1999; Benabou, 1996) stated 
that redistributing wealth from the rich, whose marginal productivity of investments 
is relatively low due to decreasing returns to individual capital investments, to the 
poor, whose marginal productivity of investment is relatively high for exactly the 
same reason, would enhance aggregate productivity and hence growth.
On establishing the connection between poverty, growth and inequality, 
one  of  the  most  recent  studies  on  this  issue  (Bourguignon,  2004)  stated  that 
distribution changes (i.e.  changes in inequality)  have a very powerful  effect  on 
poverty. The study also said that it is important to consider growth and distribution 
simultaneously and that the connection between poverty, growth and inequality is 
very country specific. In addition to Bourguignon (2004), another study mentioned 
another  aspect  of  the  relationship  between  poverty,  inequality,  and  growth 
(McCulloch et al., 2000). They stated that change in poverty can be represented 
by the sum of three components: a growth component with inequality constant, an 
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inequality component with growth constant and a residual. This means inequality 
is  an  important  aspect  in  poverty  reduction  and  thus  should  be  given  more 
attention in poverty reduction efforts.
In  formalizing  the  relationship  between  poverty,  inequality  and  growth, 
Ravallion (1997) stated that there are two channels where inequality can affect 
poverty.  The  first  channel  is  through  the  well-studied  relationship  between 
inequality  and  growth,  then  growth  and  poverty.  High  initial  inequality  retards 
growth, which in turn reduces the rate of poverty reduction. The second channel is 
the “growth-elasticity argument”.  The argument states that in a growth process 
where all levels of income grow at roughly the same rate, higher inequality means 
that the poor gain less. This means the poor will continue to have a lower share of 
the  total  income  and  its  increment  through  growth,  which  means  the  rate  of 
poverty reduction must be lower. However, this also means that the poor will suffer 
proportionately less of the impact in the event of an economic contraction. Thus, 
both high and low inequality have their own benefits and disadvantages for the 
poor. The paper also found that higher inequality tends to entail a lower rate of 
poverty reduction at any given positive rate of growth.
A study using cross-sectional and longitudinal US and German data that 
followed a set of individuals over time (Jenkins & Van Kerm, 2003) concluded that 
cross-sectional  data  cannot  be  used  to  track  the  experiences  of  particular 
individuals but only income groups, whose composition may change. The study 
also claimed that this explains why it is possible for the poor to fare badly relative 
to the rich and for income growth to be pro-poor at the same time.
Ravallion (2000) iterated that there is a need for deeper micro empirical 
work on growth and distributional change because even small changes in overall 
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distribution can matter greatly to how much the poor share in growth, and the 
absence of a correlation between growth and inequality does not mean inequality 
matters little.  In addition, the paper also stated that high or rising inequality is 
putting a brake on the prospects for poverty reduction through growth. The paper 
also warned however, that reducing inequality by adding further distortions to the 
economy will have unpredictable effects on growth and poverty reduction.
c. Studies on inequality in Indonesia
There  have  been  a  large  number  of  investigations  on  the  subject  of 
inequality conducted within the Indonesian context (for example, Skoufias  et al., 
2000; Tjiptoherijanto & Remi, 2001; Alisjahbana, 2001; Akita & Alisjahbana, 2002; 
Said & Widyanti, 2002; Akita et al., 1999 to mention a few). Most of these studies 
use  nominal  expenditure  data,  hence  disregarding  the  effect  of  regional  price 
differentials on the differences in purchasing power across regions at the same 
level of nominal expenditure. An exception is Skoufias et al. (2000) who deflated 
household nominal expenditure with a household specific deflator. Such a deflator, 
however, can only be constructed using panel data.
A study using the Theil  decomposition technique applied to  household 
expenditure data from the 1987,  1990,  and 1993 Susenas (Akita  et  al.,  1999) 
suspected that several factors such as location, province, age, education, gender 
and household size affect income inequality in Indonesia. Their results, however, 
suggested that gender appeared to be an insignificant factor in affecting inequality 
in Indonesia. Other findings from this study indicated that intra-province inequality 
was greater than inter-province inequality and rural-urban expenditure inequality 
accounted for 22% to 24% of total inequality. Furthermore, the urban inequality 
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trend continuously  increased during  the  period  under  study.  Finally,  this  study 
found that education was a significant determinant of expenditure inequality, as 
the inter-education component accounted for 30-33% of total inequality.
Another study focused on regional income inequality between 1993 and 
1998 using  district-level  GDP and population  data  using  the  two-stage  nested 
decomposition  method  (Akita  &  Alisjahbana,  2002).  This  study  concluded that 
overall income inequality measured by Theil index increased significantly over the 
1993-1997 period, from 0.262 to 0.287, during which time Indonesia achieved an 
annual average growth rate of more than 7%. On the other hand, it declined to 
0.266  during  the  crisis,  which  corresponded  to  the  level  prevailing  in  1993-
1994.This finding was supported by the finding of a study using the Theil index 
and L-index methods (Tjiptoherijanto & Remi, 2001) that, during the period prior to 
the  crisis  (between  1993  and  1996),  income  inequality  tended  to  increase  in 
Indonesia as a whole. The inequality seemed to be more apparent in urban areas 
than in rural areas and declined during the period from 1996 to 1998.
The  finding  of  a  decline  in  inequality  during  the  crisis  period  is  also 
consistent with the finding from a study by Said & Widyanti (2002). When they 
investigated  inequality  changes  among  the  population  below  the  poverty  line, 
however, the result contradicted the trend of inequality in the entire population. 
The Gini and Theil indices for the population living below the poverty line actually 
increased during the crisis period. This is consistent with the finding of a study by 
Skoufias et al. (2000) who used the 100 Village Survey data, that has a sample of 
relatively  poor  households.  They  calculated  that  the  Gini  Ratio  of  household-
specific deflated expenditure increased from 0.283 to 0.304 during the crisis. This 
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increase was  especially  driven by  the  significant  rise  in  inequality  in  the  rural 
areas, whereas in the urban areas, inequality slightly decreased.5 
d. Caveats in inequality analysis
Before proceeding further, it is useful to reiterate that inequality should not 
be used as the  sole  indicator  for  judging economic  performance of  a  country. 
Inequality only measures the distribution of income or expenditure. At one extreme 
this means that in a country where everybody is poor, inequality does not exist. 
This extreme example shows that having low inequality does not necessarily mean 
a country is doing well or a country has provided excellent social welfare to its 
people.  Therefore,  countries  with  higher  inequality  do  not  necessarily  need  to 
follow countries with lower inequality (Kaplow, 2002).
By the  same token,  increasing inequality  does not  necessarily  have a 
negative  implication.  For  example,  increasing  the  income  of  high-income 
individuals without decreasing the income of others will increase inequality, but it is 
better than nobody experiencing any increase in income at all (Feldstein, 1998).6 
This means that  discretion should be exercised when looking at  the results of 
inequality calculations. Although the calculations provide some insights into the 
condition of a country, they do not tell the whole story because, by itself, inequality 
does not even provide a partial  analysis of welfare, let alone a comprehensive 
one.
5 Curiously, Breman & Wiradi  (2002) naively concluded that  when different data sources show 
different trends of inequality during the crisis, it simply reflected changes in the researchers’ state 
of mind. 
6 This of  course assumes there is no negative externality  to the welfare of  the poor  from the 
increasing welfare of the rich. 
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IV. DATA
As already mentioned in the introduction, in calculating inequality we use 
household per capita expenditure data deflated by a regional price index, and we 
call the deflated expenditure as real expenditure. The data on nominal household 
expenditure is obtained from the Consumption Module Susenas, while the regional 
price index used is based on the regional poverty lines as calculated in Pradhan et 
al. (2001)  extended  to  other  years.  The  nature  of  data  collection  and  the 
calculation of the regional poverty lines are discussed in this section.
a. The National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas)
Susenas is a nationally representative repeated cross-section household 
survey that is conducted regularly by Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik or 
BPS), covering all areas of the country. Susenas usually consists of two parts. The 
first  part  is  conducted  in  February  each  year  and  collects  demographic  and 
socioeconomic characteristics of households and their members. This part of the 
Susenas is known as the Core Susenas. The second part of the Susenas is called 
the  Module  Susenas.  Every  year  the  module  rotates  between  Health  Module, 
Social  & Cultural  Module,  and Consumption Module.  This  means that  each of 
these modules is conducted every three years.
The one used in this study is the Consumption Module,  which collects 
very detailed data on household consumption expenditure. There are two kinds of 
consumption items in the questionnaire: food and non-food items. There are more 
than 200 items in the food category and more than 100 items in the non-food 
category. In this study, we use the Consumption Module Susenas from 1984 to 
2002,  which means data from 1984,  1987,  1990,  1993,  1996,  1999 and 2002 
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survey years, where the sample size ranges from 45,415 to 64,406 households in 
26 provinces of Indonesia.
Using expenditure as a proxy for income has been a source of grievance 
for some researchers (Robilliard et al., 2001; Mishra, 1997 for example). A study 
that examines the movement between income and consumption in the US has 
found  uneven  growth  among  the  two  (Krueger  &  Perri,  2002).  Basically  the 
grievance centres on the notion that the rich save more of their income than the 
poor,  and  this  means  inequality  calculations  using  expenditure  data  tend  to 
underestimate the actual  income inequality.  This has obscured the reliability  of 
using  expenditure  as  a  proxy  for  income  to  an  extent  that  some  found 
unacceptable. There are studies, however, that claim that consumption is a better 
measure of welfare than income (Attanasio et al., 2004; Blundell & Preston, 1998). 
At least in the case of developing countries, household expenditure data is thought 
to be much more reliable than household income data.
b. Regional poverty line calculation7
As is widely known, poverty line calculation is a straightforward but, at the 
same time, complex undertaking. In Indonesia, the poverty line that is usually used 
is the one published by BPS. In short, BPS calculates the food poverty line by 
differentiating the amount of food needed between rural and urban areas. So, for 
example, it could be the case that in urban areas food A is put at x kilograms but y 
kilogram in rural areas. There are consequences for the difference in the amount: 
one cannot really compare poverty lines between urban and rural areas and the 
respective poverty lines cannot be summarized to form a national poverty line. 
7 Discussion in this section is mostly taken from a paper published by SMERU (Pradhan  et al., 
2000), and a more detailed description can be found there.
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Moreover, BPS uses a priori assumption when choosing the reference population 
in each region. This method of choosing a reference population arbitrarily could 
lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. In the extreme, two researchers using the same 
data using exactly the same method but different  a priori  beliefs on headcount 
poverty  would  produce different  poverty  estimates  (Pradhan  et  al.,  2001).  We 
cannot, therefore, use BPS poverty lines for our purpose.
On the other hand Pradhan et al. (2001) use the same food basket in all 
regions. This means the poverty lines can be compared between regions as the 
differences in  regional  poverty  lines only  arise from the differences in regional 
prices. Secondly,  they use an iterative method to determine the true reference 
group, and hence the stable poverty line for each region, that has been freed of 
personal  a priori  assumptions. Table 2 shows the data summary of the Susenas 
nominal expenditure and Pradhan et al. (2001) poverty line for each survey year.
Table 2
Data Summary of Susenas Expenditure and Pradhan’s Poverty Line
Year N Nominal Expenditure Poverty Line
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1984 49965 19225.77 16180.34 1476 602376 14368.72 4391.53 10189.00 26904.84
1987 50954 24803.24 20492.01 2744 900694 17000.91 4894.67 12052.46 33174.64
1990 45415 31492.10 23747.21 5080 831653 19427.93 2195.75 15143.76 26461.90
1993 58906 48941.69 41363.19 5506 1906999 24964.25 2976.43 19466.20 30951.88
1996 59900 75744.11 72077.76 8338 3160063 34252.74 3640.04 27670.90 43402.59
1999 61483 152886.90 121651.40 19972 3769032 84948.11 7296.98 70199.00 102814.00
2002 64406 237008.90 268159.60 28390 21300000 98392.14 9553.97 81656.06 117940.70
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V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
a. Trends in real expenditure
As a first step, we look at the changes in mean real per capita expenditure 
by deciles of per capita expenditure over time in order to examine the differences 
in  the  trends  of  expenditure  growth  across  different  socioeconomic  levels.  By 
looking  at  these  changes,  we  can  show  quantitative  evidence  on  whether 
economic growth in Indonesia has benefited the rich more than the poor or  vice 
versa.  Table  3  provides  the  index of  mean real  per  capita  expenditure  for  all 
deciles from 1984 to 2002 with the per capita expenditure in 1984 normalized to 
100.
Table 3
Index of Mean Real Per Capita Expenditure by Decile 
(1984=100)
Year I (poorest) II III IV V
1984 100 100 100 100 100
1987 118.25 117.96 119.34 118.92 117.82
1990 169.69 156.23 149.39 143.71 139.65
1993 187.40 171.35 164.15 158.46 153.67
1996 209.52 192.91 185.32 179.48 174.33
1999 187.05 169.92 160.87 153.59 147.68
2002 232.21 211.21 200.94 192.72 185.88
Year VI VII VIII IX X (richest)
1984 100 100 100 100 100
1987 116.70 115.78 114.87 114.34 117.38
1990 136.00 132.24 129.44 127.22 128.98
1993 149.89 146.97 145.10 143.84 149.91
1996 170.48 167.46 165.65 164.51 177.99
1999 143.05 138.51 133.96 129.75 126.90
2002 180.55 175.63 172.38 169.87 176.02
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Table 3 shows that during the high growth period from 1984-1996, mean 
per  capita  expenditure  of  the  poorest  decile  increased by  110% (from 100  to 
209.5),  implying  that  economic  growth  improves  the  welfare  of  the  poor.8 
Furthermore, this increase was the highest compared to the increases in other 
deciles. In fact, from the lowest to the ninth decile, the increase in real per capita 
expenditure was lower the higher  the decile.  The increase experienced by the 
ninth decile during the same period is only 65%. The increase experienced by the 
richest decile (78%) was, however, relatively high and comparable to the increase 
experienced  by  the  fourth  decile.  This  implies  that  the  high  economic  growth 
during this period has, in general, been relatively pro-poor, with the exception that 
the richest decile grew faster than the middle deciles.
In 1999, due to the crisis, the mean per capita expenditure of all deciles 
fell substantially, reflecting the negative impact of the crisis on the population at all 
socio-economic levels. Table 3 clearly shows, however, that the decline in real 
expenditure is larger the higher the decile, implying that the richest decile was hit 
hardest by the crisis. As a result, relative to the distribution in 1984, there was an 
improvement in expenditure distribution in 1999.
After recovery in 2002, the real expenditure of all deciles bounced back 
and even surpassed the 1996 level,  except  for  the richest decile that was still 
slightly below the 1996 level. This is most likely due to the fact that the top decile 
suffered  the  largest  decline  in  expenditure  during  the  crisis.  In  terms  of 
expenditure distribution relative to the base year of 1984, however, the growth of 
expenditure of the top decile was still higher than the eighth and ninth deciles.
8 The highest jump occurred between 1987 and 1990, where the lowest decile’s mean expenditure 
increased to 70% above 1984, while the highest decile’s mean expenditure only increased to 30%. 
Timmer (2004) also found that 1987-1990 was one of only two periods between 1984 and 2002 
where income growth of the bottom quintile was higher than average income growth.
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In terms of how the poor fare relative to the whole population and the rich, 
Table 4 shows the ratio of total expenditure of the poorest 20% to total expenditure 
of the whole population and the ratio of total expenditure of the poorest 10% to 
total expenditure of the richest 10%. The table shows that the two ratios moved in 
parallel.  Between 1984 and 1990, both ratios increased substantially, indicating 
that the poor gained more of the benefit of economic growth during this period. As 
the economy grew further in the period between 1990 and 1996, however, the 
poor gained less than the whole population and, in particular, compared to the 
richest  group.  This  implies that  the impact  of  economic growth on the relative 
position of the poor cannot be taken for granted.
Table 4
Ratio of Total Real Expenditure (%)
Year Poorest 20% to whole population Poorest 10% to richest 10%
1984 7.34 10.87
1987 7.42 10.95
1990 8.80 14.32
1993 8.64 13.64
1996 8.41 12.82
1999 9.33 16.06
2002 8.91 14.30
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As the previous Table 3 has shown that the impact of the crisis was larger 
for the higher deciles, consequently the two ratios in Table 4 jumped significantly 
in 1999. This means that although the crisis made the poor worse off in absolute 
terms, their share in the economy relative to the whole population, and particularly 
to the rich, actually increased. As the economy recovered in the following period, 
both ratios fell back. The share of the poor in the economy in 2002 was, however, 
still similar to their share during the pre-crisis peak in 1990.
b. Gini ratio
Table 5 provides the Gini ratios of real expenditure from 1984 to 2002 for 
the whole country as well as disaggregated by urban and rural areas. The table 
shows that  total  inequality  decreased from 1984 to  1990,  then increased from 
1990 to 1996, but decreased again by a large extent between 1996 and 1999, and 
finally increased again during the recovery period between 1999 and 2002. 
Table 5
Gini Ratio of Real Per Capita Expenditure
Year Urban % change from Rural % change from Total % change from
 previous year  previous year  previous year
1984 0.35 - 0.32 - 0.35 -
1987 0.36 2.86 0.30 -6.25 0.35 0.00
1990 0.34 -5.56 0.26 -13.33 0.32 -8.57
1993 0.34 0.00 0.27 3.85 0.33 3.13
1996 0.36 5.88 0.28 3.70 0.34 3.03
1999 0.32 -11.11 0.25 -10.71 0.30 -11.76
2002 0.33 3.13 0.26 4.00 0.32 6.67
       
In urban areas, the result is roughly the same except inequality actually 
increased  between  1984  and  1987.  In  contrast,  rural  areas  experienced  the 
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opposite, where inequality decreased between 1984 and 1987. In terms of the 
relative magnitude of inequality between urban and rural areas, inequality in rural 
areas at any given year is always lower than that in urban areas.
These trends are consistent with the figures obtained from the trends and 
ratios of deciles of expenditures discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, 
this trend is also consistent with the result from a recent study of inequality in 
Indonesia (Sudjana & Mishra, 2004), although the actual ratios themselves are 
quite different since the study used nominal expenditure data. 
If we look at those below the poverty line, inequality actually increased 
slightly between 1996 and 1999, from 0.0914 to 0.0986. This shows that although 
inequality decreased in total, there was an increase in inequality among the poor, 
which was mainly caused by more people falling into poverty, hence the group 
became more heterogeneous. The increase in inequality among the poor during 
the crisis is also the finding in Said & Widyanti (2002).
c. Generalized Entropy (GE) index
As already mentioned in section III, the GE index is a class of inequality 
measure that allows for an additive decomposition of inequality to the intra and 
inter-group level. This feature makes the GE index one of the popular indices used 
in analysing inequality. Table 6 shows GE indices for two different values of α. In 
choosing which α is more relevant for Indonesia, our choice is based on studies 
that showed that Indonesians are vulnerable to poverty (Suryahadi  & Sumarto, 
2003; Chowdury & Setiadi, 2002).9 On the other hand, the “10 to 10 ratio” in Table 
9 Suryahadi and Sumarto (2003) wrote that vulnerability to poverty is defined as the probability of 
falling below the poverty line. The total vulnerable group (TVG) includes all those who are currently 
poor plus those who are currently  non-poor but  have a relatively strong chance of  falling into 
poverty  in  the  near  future.  Between  1996  and  1999,  TVG  increased  from  18.1%  to  33.7%. 
Moreover, Chowdury and Setiadi (2002) provided the widely documented fact that when measured 
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4 shows that the ratio actually increased during the crisis, which means that the 
richest 10% suffered from a larger decline in welfare than the poorest 10%. We 
shall, therefore, discuss the GE results mainly using GE(0) and GE(2), because 
GE(0) is more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution while GE(2) 
is sensitive to changes in the higher tail.
using a poverty line of US$1/day only 7.8% of Indonesians were poor in 2001 but increasing the 
line to US$2/day caused the poverty rate to jump to 60%.
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Table 6
Generalized Entropy Indices
Year Urban Percentage Rural Percentage Total Percentage Intra Percentage Inter Percentage
change change change group change group change
GE(0)
1984 0.2103 - 0.1640 - 0.2071 - 0.1749 - 0.0323 -
1987 0.2214 5.28 0.1524 -7.07 0.2044 -1.30 0.1712 -2.12 0.0332 2.79
1990 0.1906 -13.91 0.1133 -25.66 0.1648 -19.37 0.1369 -20.04 0.0279 -15.96
1993 0.1905 -0.05 0.1168 3.09 0.1764 7.04 0.1413 3.21 0.0350 25.45
1996 0.2062 8.24 0.1286 10.10 0.1882 6.69 0.1566 10.83 0.0315 -10.00
1999 0.1648 -20.08 0.1049 -18.43 0.1461 -22.37 0.1285 -17.94 0.0176 -44.13
2002 0.1809 9.77 0.1084 3.34 0.1674 14.58 0.1406 9.42 0.0267 51.70
GE(2)
1984 0.2915 - 0.2325 - 0.3199 - 0.2815 - 0.0384 -
1987 0.3269 12.14 0.3076 32.30 0.3802 18.85 0.3421 21.53 0.0381 -0.78
1990 0.3065 -6.24 0.1608 -47.72 0.2858 -24.83 0.2548 -25.52 0.0309 -18.90
1993 0.3334 8.78 0.1836 14.18 0.3325 16.34 0.2942 15.46 0.0383 23.95
1996 0.3948 18.42 0.2385 29.90 0.3902 17.35 0.3566 21.21 0.0336 -12.27
1999 0.2831 -28.29 0.1770 -25.79 0.2656 -31.93 0.2474 -30.62 0.0183 -45.54
2002 0.4373 54.47 0.1740 -1.69 0.3959 49.06 0.3689 49.11 0.0269 46.99
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The pattern of GE(0) is almost identical to the pattern of Gini coefficients, 
although the percentage changes are more extreme. Overall inequality decreased 
from 1984 to 1990 then increased until 1996 and dropped to its lowest level in 15 
years  in  1999  before  increasing  again  in  2002.  In  urban  areas,  inequality 
increased between 1984 and 1987, then decreased in 1990 and 1993 before rising 
again in 1996 in the pre-crisis period. Inequality then declined to its lowest level in 
15 years in 1999, before increasing again in 2002. On the other hand, in rural 
areas  the  pattern  is  identical  to  the  combined  group.  In  terms  of  percentage 
increase or decrease, the largest decreases were in rural areas where inequality 
decreased  by  almost  26%  in  1990  compared  to  1987  and  inter-group  where 
inequality  first  increased  by  25%  between  1990  and  1993,  dropped  by  44% 
between 1996 and 1999, and increased again by 51.7% between 1999 and 2002.
By  using  the  advantage  of  GE we  can  see  that  intra-group  inequality 
accounts for most of the inequality. There are several observations that can be 
gathered here. First,  between 1984 and 1987, intra-group inequality decreased 
while at the same time inter-group inequality increased. In order to explain this, we 
see that during the same period urban inequality increased while rural inequality 
decreased.  This  means  that  almost  all  intra-group  decreases  in  inequality 
happened in rural areas. The opposite trend took place between 1993 and 1996, 
where intra-group inequality increased while inter-group inequality decreased. If 
we  look  at  the  separate  rural  and  urban  inequalities,  Table  6  shows  that,  in 
percentage terms, the increase in inequality in rural areas was greater than the 
increase in inequality in urban areas. So between 1993 and 1996, urban areas 
managed to keep the increase in inequality below that of rural areas and narrowed 
the gap between them.
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Secondly, the calculations show that, although total inequality decreased 
in  1999,  the  percentage  decrease  in  intra-group  inequality  was  much  smaller 
compared to the decrease in inter-group inequality and the intra-group’s share of 
all-group  inequality  was  the  highest  in  1999.  This  implies  that  there  was  a 
narrowing of the gap in inequality between urban and rural areas. On the other 
hand, between 1999 and 2002, the increase in inequality happened more between 
rural and urban areas rather than within areas, as shown by the large percentage 
point increase in inter-group inequality compared to intra-group. This means the 
effect of the crisis that had lessened inter-group inequality considerably had been 
totally reversed by 2002.
Finally, the results show that the decrease in inequality between 1996 and 
1999 could be attributed to the fact that the crisis had hit high-income households 
disproportionately harder and this contributed to a reduction in the income gap 
(Said and Widyanti, 2002). This impact had been channelled through large shifts in 
relative prices that may have benefited those in the rural economy relative to those 
in the modern-formal economy (Remy & Tjiptoherijanto, 1999). This is supported 
by the greater decline in inequality in urban areas than in rural areas, although 
urban  areas  still  had  higher  inequality  than  rural  areas  in  1999.  Looking  at 
inequality  in  2002,  however,  it  is  clear  that  high-income  households  have 
recovered to their pre-crisis level of income much faster, proven by the fact that 
the percentage point increase in inequality in urban areas was three times larger 
than in rural areas. In other words, they had been hit disproportionately hard by 
the  crisis  but  also bounced back much faster,  thus  increasing inequality  once 
again.
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This conclusion is reinforced by the GE(2) results that also show a similar 
pattern, although the inequality is much higher in all specifications except inter-
group. For example, in 2002 inequality in urban areas reached 0.4373, more than 
twice as high as GE(0) that recorded 0.1809. In addition, the percentage change is 
also much higher in most specifications and years in GE(2) than GE(0). If we look 
specifically  at  the  1996-2002  period,  the  crisis  reduced  inequality  in  all 
specifications by 26% to 46%, with the greatest reduction in inequality between 
urban and rural  areas. As the crisis dissipated, only rural  areas experienced a 
decrease in inequality, by just 1.7%. Inequality in urban areas increased by 55%, 
intra–group inequality increased by 49%, and inter-group by 47%. This proves that 
there is indeed more movement in the top level of the distribution, meaning they 
had been hit harder than the poor by the crisis, but they have recovered stronger 
than before.
d. Atkinson index
The Atkinson index is more “bottom-sensitive”,  which means it  is more 
strongly correlated with the extent of poverty (Kawachi, 2000). In contrast to GE 
measures, intra and inter-group inequalities in the Atkinson index cannot be added 
to obtain combined group inequality and thus are left out of the discussion. Table 7 
provides  the  results  of  inequality  calculations  in  Indonesia  using  the  Atkinson 
Index.
Table 7
Atkinson Inequality Results Using Different Values of Epsilon
Year Urban % change from Rural % change from All % change from
previous year previous year Groups previous year
A(0.5)
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1984 0.1010 - 0.0811 - 0.1021 -
1987 0.1066 5.54 0.0766 -5.55 0.1022 0.10
1990 0.0956 -10.32 0.0573 -25.20 0.0844 -17.42
1993 0.0962 0.63 0.0598 4.36 0.0908 7.58
1996 0.1052 9.36 0.0665 11.20 0.0975 7.38
1999 0.0839 -20.25 0.0537 -19.25 0.0753 -22.77
2002 0.0936 11.56 0.0559 4.10 0.0872 15.80
A(1)
1984 0.1896 - 0.1513 - 0.1871 -
1987 0.1986 4.75 0.1413 -6.57 0.1849 -1.18
1990 0.1736 -12.59 0.1071 -24.21 0.1519 -17.85
1993 0.1734 -0.12 0.1102 2.89 0.1617 6.45
1996 0.1863 7.44 0.1207 9.53 0.1715 6.06
1999 0.1519 -18.46 0.0996 -17.48 0.1359 -20.76
2002 0.1655 8.95 0.1027 3.11 0.1541 13.39
A(2)
1984 0.3402 - 0.2683 - 0.3210 -
1987 0.3517 3.38 0.2498 -6.90 0.3135 -2.34
1990 0.2932 -16.63 0.1908 -23.62 0.2549 -18.69
1993 0.2908 -0.82 0.1927 1.00 0.2671 4.79
1996 0.3053 4.99 0.2073 7.58 0.2793 4.57
1999 0.2570 -15.82 0.1766 -14.81 0.2300 -17.65
2002 0.2736 6.46 0.1794 1.59 0.2538 10.35
       
According to this index, inequality in urban areas had increased between 
1984  and  1987  before  dropping  in  1990  and  1993.  Then,  inequality  again 
increased in 1996 before decreasing in 1999. This is identical to patterns found in 
Gini  and  GE  calculations.  On  the  other  side  of  the  coin,  rural  and  all-group 
inequalities exhibit the same pattern, where both experienced decreases between 
1984 and 1990 before increasing in 1993 and 1996. In 1999, inequality decreased. 
Between 1999 and 2002, we see that inequality in urban areas increased by a 
much higher percentage than in rural  areas after  also decreasing by a greater 
percentage between 1996 and 1999.
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VI. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF INEQUALITY IN POVERTY REDUCTION
We now turn to the second part of our study, where we try to establish the 
relationship between inequality, poverty and growth in the context of Indonesia. 
Specifically,  we  aim  to  establish  the  role  of  inequality  in  poverty  reduction 
observed in the country. First, Table 8 provides the trends of poverty rate, GE(2) 
inequality measure and expenditure growth index in rural and urban areas so that 
we can see their movements during the 1984-2002 period. We use GE(2) as our 
inequality measure for reasons stated in section IV.
Table 8  
Poverty Rate (%), GE(2) Inequality Measure, and Mean Real Expenditure Index (1984=100)
in Urban and Rural Areas, 1984-2002
Urban Rural Total
Year Poverty GE(2) Mean Real Poverty GE(2) Mean Real Poverty GE(2) Mean Real
 Rate  Expenditure  Rate  Expenditure  Rate  Expenditure
1984 29.25 0.2915 100 65.1 0.2325 100 56.68 0.3199 100
1987 24.30 0.3269 112.81 54.08 0.3076 114.53 45.95 0.3802 116.67
1990 16.65 0.3065 123.67 39.72 0.1608 133.09 32.68 0.2858 134.87
1993 10.22 0.3334 140.76 32.86 0.1836 144.22 25.32 0.3325 151.71
1996 7.11 0.3948 156.45 23.28 0.2385 165.99 17.44 0.3902 174.53
1999 16.33 0.2831 114.97 33.93 0.177 139.33 27.00 0.2656 139.38
2002 5.47 0.4373 152.23 17.61 0.174 169.71 12.22 0.3959 181.27
          
Looking  at  the  mean expenditure  index,  the  crisis  nearly  eliminated  a 
decade’s progress in mean expenditure in urban areas, taking the 1999 mean 
expenditure level almost back to the 1987 level, a huge drop from the height of the 
boom in 1996 where mean expenditure was 56% higher than its 1984 level. In 
1999, the figure stood at merely 15% higher than 1984. Although, it bounced back 
by 2002, it is still lower than the pre-crisis level. Mean expenditure in urban areas 
also experienced the least  positive change compared to the rural  and national 
figures. In 1996, a year before the crisis hit,  rural  mean expenditure was 66% 
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higher than 1984 while national mean expenditure was 75% higher than 1984. The 
crisis  also  did  not  have  as  detrimental  an  effect  in  rural  areas  and  nationally 
compared to urban areas since in both areas mean expenditure was still  39% 
higher than 1984.10 In addition, in 2002, the mean expenditures in both rural and 
national levels have not only bounced back but have increased higher than pre-
crisis levels. Although urban areas changed the least, it has to be acknowledged 
that urban areas still have higher mean expenditure than rural areas, a fact that is 
not shown in the table.
Comparing  poverty  rates  and  mean  expenditure,  it  is  clear  that  as 
expenditure increased, the poverty rate declined. This result is in accordance with 
expectations. It is quite interesting to see that in urban areas, even though the 
mean expenditure index in  1999 was almost  the same as the 1987 level,  the 
poverty rate was much smaller in 1999 than in 1987.
On the  other  hand,  the  inequality  and mean expenditure  index mostly 
moved in parallel, with inequality increasing (decreasing) each time expenditure 
increased  (decreased).  The  exception  is  during  the  period  between  1987  and 
1990. In addition, it is interesting to see that in 1999, the only time when mean 
expenditure index dropped compared to previous period, inequality also dropped 
to  its  lowest  level.  Finally,  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  poverty  is 
negative, except, once again, for the period between 1987 and 1990.
To see how inequality affects the poverty-growth relationship, we utilize a 
model used by Ravallion (1997) to see the “distribution-corrected” growth elasticity 
10 This is consistent with the findings in Wetterberg et al. (1999).
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of poverty rate. We use provincial level data from 1984 to 2002 in order to get 
sufficient observations.11 The estimation result is:
( )3.699 1 ............(4)r I g residual= − − +
with a heteroskedasticity corrected standard error of 0.809 and an R2 of 
0.2943, where r is the rate of growth of poverty rate between two periods, I is the 
initial Gini ratio, and g is the growth rate between the two periods. However, joint 
F-tests reject two tests with null hypothesis that only growth matters and that only 
“distribution-corrected”  growth  matters.12 This  result  means  that  the  poverty-
reducing  effect  of  growth  depends  on  the  state  of  inequality.  As  inequality 
increases, the elasticity decreases.
In  conclusion,  we  have  shown  that  high  inequality  reduces  growth 
elasticity of poverty. This means that the higher inequality the less impact growth 
has on reducing poverty. Most importantly, this also explains why the poverty rate 
between 1999 and 2002 decreased very rapidly: because inequality in 1999 was 
at its lowest, thus the impact of growth on poverty reduction was high.
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this investigation has been to assess what happened to 
inequality during Indonesia’s high growth and crisis eras and to examine whether 
inequality is related to poverty reduction in Indonesia. We use various widely used 
and familiar tools and manage to unearth several interesting results.
11 From the 26 provinces in Indonesia, we gathered 153 observations between 1984 and 2002 ((6 x 
26)-3=153). The three provinces of Aceh, Papua and Maluku were not surveyed in 2002 because 
of civil unrest.
12 This is different to the result obtained by Ravallion (1997). Putting in fixed-effects or random-
effects did not remedy the situation. We believe, however, that our result still shows the importance 
of inequality in the relationship between poverty and growth.
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First, looking at several inequality measures we found that inequality was 
actually at  its  lowest in 1999. During the period under investigation, there was 
quite a mixed pattern of inequality trends. It decreased between 1984 and 1990, 
increased between 1990 and 1996, then dropped in 1999 before finally increasing 
again in 2002.
Second, disaggregating by rural and urban areas revealed that intra-group 
inequality accounted for most of the inequality in Indonesia. What we have now 
established  is  that  inequality  between  urban  and  rural  areas  in  Indonesia  is 
relatively lower than the inequality between the rich and the poor in each area.
Third, the changes in mean expenditure across deciles from 1984 to 2002 
show that  the bottom decile experienced the greatest  positive change and the 
change  decreased  as  one  moves  up  to  higher  deciles.  On  the  other  hand, 
although  people  in  lower  deciles  experienced  higher  percentage  expenditure 
increases than people in higher deciles, we argue that they are still  very much 
behind in terms of actual expenditure — total expenditure of the poorest 20% only 
accounted for 9% of total expenditure in 2002. In 1999, after the crisis, the ratio 
was at its highest level since 1984. This finding proves that people in lower deciles 
were hit less hard during the period than those in higher deciles. The rich bounced 
back by 2002 however, as shown by a decrease in the “10 to 10” ratio.
Fourth, the fact that in 1999 inequality was at its lowest level while the 
poverty rate was higher than the 1993 level suggested that two things happened 
during the crisis: people in higher deciles lost more than people in lower deciles in 
terms of mean expenditure.  This caused inequality to decrease and there was 
enough decrease in the expenditure of  people in lower deciles that some who 
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were not poor before the crisis became poor because of the crisis, thus increasing 
the poverty rate.
Finally, we have proven the importance of reducing inequality (improving 
income distribution) as a means to increase the impact of economic growth on 
poverty reduction, because inequality influences the growth elasticity of poverty. 
As  inequality  increases,  the  elasticity  decreases.  At  high  levels  of  inequality, 
growth would have less effect  on Indonesia’s  quest to reduce poverty.  This is 
partly proven by the fact that poverty reduction between 1999 and 2002 was very 
successful, that inequality in 1999 was at its lowest level in 15 years and resulted 
in the increased impact of growth on poverty reduction.
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